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ABSTRACT: Systemic risk is getting increasing attention in the science as well as popular press not to the least due to the growing 
complexity of the world as well as increasing data availability. The aim of this paper is to discuss selected topics in extreme and 
systemic risk modelling, measuring and management approaches. We nd that from a purely quantitative modelling perspective, single 
and systemic risk assessment can be jointly performed via the concept of copulas and therefore can be embedded within an integrated 
framework without major difculties. Consequently, we see single and systemic risks as not independent but indivisible which have 
to be assessed jointly. However, from a risk measure perspective we see some important differences as single risk measures focus on 
probability distributions while systemic risk measures focus on dependency measures. Hence, we call for ensembles of risk measures 
which should be a superior approach for studying single and systemic risks in complex networks as different events can cause systemic 
risk to realize (e.g. too big to fail, too interconnected to fail, keystone species etc.). From a risk management perspective, we conclude 
that the inclusion of human agents causes a fundamental difference in the management of systemic risks compared to other systems as 
their decisions are contingent and may cause unpredictable shifts due to mutual uncertainties that can evolve. Consequently, we argue 
for an iterative risk management approach similar to the call from climate change and adaptation science, for example discussed in the 
various IPCC reports. Last but not least, the idea of collective responsibility echoes the need to target risks that threaten whole societies. 
That such risks are reduced is foremost in the public interest and we therefore call for an institutional change that enables the effective 
handling of it in the future. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
We start our discussion via the simple observation that a system usually contains some elements which are interconnected. Furthermore, 
these elements can be “at risk”. One standard denition of risk is effect of uncertainty on objectives, most often quantied as the 
probability of the event happening, times its impact. Contrary to single or individual risk denitions, “systemic risk” emphasis the 
connections between risks (“sometimes also called networked risks”) (Helbing, 2013). While the realization of single risk may lead 
to a disaster in part of the system, the realization of systemic risk, by denition, leads to a breakdown or at least major dysfunction 
of the whole system. Research on systemic risk is not new but particularly the nancial crisis of 2007/2008 increased the interest in 
and funding for systemic risk (focusing mostly on the nancial sector) to unprecedented levels. In other disciplines such as ecology 
there was already some time ago a paradigm shift from single actor/risk to dynamic network analysis including the investigation of 
systemic risks (for a review see for example Scheffer and Carpenter 2003). Interestingly, the bulk of research especially from a systemic 
risk perspective does not include humans at all (Page, 2015). The attention in systemic risks and ways of reduction is increasing also 
in applied and social science related disciplines, for example within the Loss and Damage debate, the SDGs related discussion as 
well as the Sendai Framework for Risk Reduction. However, currently there are no conceptual overviews of similarities/differences 
of systemic risks within physical-, ecological-, nancial-systems as well as society (and its sub-system) as a whole and how they 
differ. Consequently, there are open questions if there are fundamental differences between such systems and therefore also in the 
methodologies which should be applied to model, measure as well as predict and manage (including repairing to restore a the system as 
well as reducing the risk) their systemic risks. The main goal of this paper is to shed some light on these issues and provide new avenues 
for a joint framework for future research and collaboration. We structure the paper around two important aspects. One is quantitative 
in nature and asks how individual and systemic risk are modelled, measured as well as managed in respective elds. The second aspect 
relates to the human dimension and its importance in regards to social aspects, possible biases, as well as its contingency relevant for 
systemic risk. Based on these aspects we suggest potential synergies and relevant differences, using the concept of copulas, iterative 
risk management approaches and the suggestion to connect future research on this topic in a similar way as within the climate change 
community, e.g. IPCC process. The ideas here are taken from a upcoming paper by  Hochrainer-Stigler et al., (2017).
118
SEE 7
IDRiM 2016
2. MEASURING, MODELLING AND MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEMIC AND EXTREME RISKS
Due to space limitations we only present the joint modelling framework idea and the main messages and refer for more details to 
upcoming publications of the author. We see analogies between the importance of the probability distribution for single risk and 
the importance of connectedness for systemic risk. In more detail, for single risk the different risk measures can be related to the 
different risk layers of the probability distribution, e.g. mean and median are used to represent frequent risks, tail measures like VaR 
or CVaR are used for describing extreme outcomes. In the case of systemic risk the different risk measures are related to the network 
interdependencies and consequences due to internal events, e.g. SES for measuring the contribution of a node to a systemic crisis or 
DebtRank for measuring the centrality of a node within a network. As in the case for single risk some of them have the potential to act 
as warning indicators too. For single risks the Conditional Value at Risk stands out exceptional also due to its nice properties including 
being a coherent risk measure (Pug and Roemisch, 2007) for systemic risk DebtRank may be a promising warning measure ( Poledna 
and Thurner, 2015).  
Recognizing that the failure of single nodes may cause systemic risk to realize it seems worthwhile to think about ways how to combine 
single risk measures with measures of systemic risks as both are intrinsically connected. Given that the probability distribution is the 
focal point for single risk measures and interconnectedness the focal point for systemic risk measures a possible connection between 
the two could be established via the use of copulas. Figure 1 is conceptually showing this idea using 2 single nodes, their single risks 
in terms of loss distribution and the copula model for the two nodes. 
Fig. 1: Conceptual example how to link single risk with systemic risks incorporating increase in the tightness of connection between nodes using a 
copula model
As indicated, during normal times (blue area, this corresponds to the frequent events for node 1 and 2) the copula indicates a loose 
connection between them (lower gure on the right hand side) while for increasing severe or extreme events (red area, this corresponds 
to the tails of the 2 nodes and corresponds to extreme events) the copula model enforces a tighter connection between the two nodes. 
Consequently, systemic risk may be quite different during these distinct situations, e.g. DebtRank may show different centrality values 
for the two distinct situations due to the changes in the network structure. 
In more detail, copulas are useful for modelling dependencies between continuous random variables. Using a copula model allows to 
separate the selection of the marginal distributions (e.g. the risk in form of a loss distributions) from the selection of the copula (e.g. the 
dependency between risks). In other words, while the marginal distributions contain the information of the separate risks, the copula 
contains the information about the structure of the dependency. For example, the two-dimensional distribution (e.g. a network of two 
nodes) could be represented with the marginal distributions (e.g. single risks) via the copula C as:
F(x,y)=C(F(x),F(y))
Hence, a copula approach as a measure of systemic risk seems promising too. However, while acknowledging some possible linkages 
it should be also stressed that for systemic risk analysis the dependency measures within the network are of foremost importance 
and sometimes require different modelling approaches (also due to data limitations) making it impossible to perform an additional 
investigation on the individual level. 
3. HUMAN AGENCY
There seems to be a discrepancy between the increasing understanding of systemic risk from a natural science perspective and the 
actual implementation challenges to model, warn, repair or manage systemic risks in the real world. In fact, most of the systemic risk 
research done today does not include humans at all (Page 2015). This is alarming as failure of social (e.g. nancial, infrastructure, 
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trade, ecological) systems can have dramatic, possible long lasting impacts and consequently the management of systemic risk should 
be foremost also in the public interest (Centeno et al., 2015). This section therefore focuses on the human agency dimension related to 
systemic risk. Again, due to page limitation we focus only on social processes causing increases of old and creation of new systemic 
risk which leads to the notion of contingency as an important cornerstone about the question how to manage systemic risk in the real 
world. 
Generally speaking, modernity reexively relies on increasing complexity to manage the very risks it creates which in turn causes 
disasters that are often embedded in the very construction of social organizations and institutions. In other words, the benets and 
efciencies which resulted from specialization of labor, economies of scale, collective knowledge, and information sharing exposes 
us now to disastrous outcomes which are derived from the characteristics of the relationships themselves. Theoretically, Beck with his 
idea of a reexive risk society, Parsons with his idea of negative feedback loops to maintain order and building on him Luhmann with 
his focus on systems theory and complexity reduction, as well as Giddens with his positive emphasis on modernization and future, 
provided major contributions from a social science perspective. In his review of the emergence of global systemic risk Centeno et al. 
(2015) arrange theories of risk within the social sciences along a continuum from realist to constructivist. For the former a fundamental 
assumption is the possibility to probabilistically assess the likelihood and impact of any specied risk given its inherent characteristics. 
For the later the existence and nature of risk derives from its political, historical and social context, i.e. it is constructed. Therefore, 
risks do not exist independently from society, but are created socially in response to the need to regulate populations, interactions and 
processes. While the methodological approaches between the two are very different both viewpoints call for a continuous monitoring 
and management of current and identication of emerging systemic risks. The concept of iterative systemic risk management may 
provide a practical approach to deal with current and emerging systemic risks in such a dynamic setting.  This can be achieved using 
the notion of contingency as discussed next. 
Surprisingly little can be found about the distinct feature of social processes and human decisions in regards to systemic risk. One 
exception is Ermakoff (2015) which presents a new perspective on the structure of contingency which he illustrates via the political and 
social rupture in August 4, 1789, in Versailles. Ermakoff, (2015) claims that the moments of collective indecision which is generated 
by mutual uncertainty are the moment in which rules, procedures, scripts, and norms get suspended. Consequently these are the 
moments of contingency and high systemic risk. The focus on contingency moments therefore pins down the sudden susceptibility of 
collective behaviour to individual agency factors. In fact, many questions related to transition and systemic risks of social processes 
could be related to contingency in this sense (Cohen 2015). Contingency based on references to agency emphasizes a type of variability 
especially relevant in our context, namely the role of free will as a fundamental postulate (in the sense of being always possible) and 
therefore the essential indetermination of human agency. It should be noted that there could be also a negative reading of the agency 
factor which focus on the frailty of human judgments (e.g. hindsight bias). Such subjective contingencies that bulk large in every 
rapidly changing situation ‘are’ contingencies due to ignorance and error. These effects are mostly underrepresented in current systemic 
risk analysis and formal network dynamics are less able to capture such effects. Contrary to network systems focusing on rational 
agents or formal models, for decision making processes and on the policy level contingencies as discussed above (and mainly in the 
case of systemic risk) come from mutual uncertainties of social groups and are unpredictable, e.g. comes with a surprise.
As indicated, the possibility of moments of collective indecision which may be generated by mutual uncertainty (e.g. such as nancial 
crises) are the moments of contingency and high systemic risks. During such times the usual rules, procedures, scripts, and norms can 
get suspended and new ones can suddenly appear causing causal breaks not being able to be incorporated within formal modelling 
frameworks. This calls for a management approach quite different to usual risk management strategies. The situation maybe compared 
to the discussion about possible climate change effects now and in the future and its consequences as well as possibilities to cope with 
them (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2015). Due to these deep uncertainties, the IPCC suggests an iterative risk management approach for 
tackling such kind of risks as
[…] an iterative process of monitoring, research, evaluation, learning, and innovation can reduce disaster risk and promote 
adaptive management in the context of climate extremes (high agreement, robust evidence) […] Adaptation efforts benet 
from iterative risk management strategies because of the complexity, uncertainties, and long time frame associated with 
climate change (high condence) […] Addressing knowledge gaps through enhanced observation and research can reduce 
uncertainty and help in designing effective adaptation and risk management strategies (IPCC 2012, p. 17)
Hence in an ideal case, systemic risk assessment and management is performed in an iterative fashion that allows for continuous 
learning and course correction as new information becomes available. This should not only include the (important) possibility of (re-)
framing the problem and approaches, or creating increased awareness of risk drivers, or enable a continuous learning of analysts and 
stakeholders but also the chance to introduce new innovative concepts, and nally the possibility for transformation. The introduction 
of possible ways to change the network topology of nancial markets via taxes is a concrete example of how this could be actually 
achieved ( Poledna and Thurner, 2015). However, other systemic risks not being able to be captured in formal models should be not 
forgotten. From an iterative risk assessment perspective both the systems perspective as well as the single risk dimension needs to be 
monitored and assessed. A necessary condition also indicated by Helbing (2013) is the introduction of collective responsibility and 
corresponding decision makers which focus on systemic risk modeling, measuring and managing from the systems perspective. There, 
depending on the risk bearer within the system, different time horizons may be appropriate for conducting (systemic) risk assessments. 
Summarizing, to tackle the implementation challenge and the various issues addressed above a global commitment must be made 
which we suggest could be framed around the processes developed for combating climate change effects which nally ended in the 
establishment of the intergovernmental panel for climate change. Furthermore, an iterative systemic risk management approach may 
be the best way forward to address the complex issues of dealing with current and avoiding the creation of new systemic risks around 
the globe.
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4. CONCLUSION
Systemic risk is getting increasing attention in the scientic world as well as popular press not to the least due to the growing complexity 
of the world as well as increasing data availability (Page, 2015). While its origins are in mathematics (such as catastrophe theory) the 
concept found relatively early entry into the ecological realm and after the Asia crisis in the late 90s and especially after the nancial 
crisis in 2007/2008 into the nancial and risk disciplines. The human dimension aspect was up to now and with a few exceptions largely 
neglected. Furthermore, single risk assessment and particularly the possible disastrous outcomes which may be linked to systemic risks 
were also not looked at in detail. 
The aim of this paper was to shed more light on selected topics of systemic risk modelling, measuring and management. We were 
especially interested in possible differences and reasons for it and how much they matter. We made various observations including 
that from a purely quantitative modelling perspective single and systemic risk assessment can be jointly performed via the concept of 
copulas and therefore can be embedded within an integrated framework without major difculties. Consequently, one can treat single 
and systemic risks jointly. However, from a risk measure perspective we see important differences as single risk measures focus on 
probability distributions while systemic risk measures focus on dependency measures. Hence, we call for ensembles of risk measures 
which should be a superior approach for studying single and systemic risks in complex networks as different events can cause systemic 
risk to realize. 
From a risk management perspective, we conclude that the inclusion of human agents causes a signicant difference in the management 
of systemic risks compared to other systems as their decisions are contingent and may cause unpredictable shifts due to mutual 
uncertainties that can evolve. Consequently, we argue for an iterative risk management approach similar to the call from climate change 
and adaptation science, for example discussed in the various IPCC reports ( Mochizuki et al., 2015, Schinko et al., 2016). Last but not 
least, the idea of collective responsibility echoes the need to target risks that threaten whole societies. That such risks are reduced is 
foremost in the public interest and we therefore call for an institutional change that enables the effective handling of it for the future 
similar to the process which leads nally to the intergovernmental panel for climate change. 
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